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THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
Abstract
Considerable concern has been expressed in recent years about declines in
voter participation rates in the United States and in several other major
democratic countries.  Some feel low participation rates introduce a “class
bias” into the political process and thereby worsen the outcomes from it.
Little empirical work exists, however, that measures the effects of lower
participation on the welfare of a country.  This paper begins to fill this void.  It
presents cross-national evidence that high levels of democratic participation
are associated with more equal distributions of income.  The paper’s results
also imply, however, that this reduction in income inequality comes at a cost.
High participation rates are related to larger government sectors which in turn
lead to slower economic growth.  We also present evidence of the “capture”
of government by upper income groups in Latin and Central American
countries.
















Participation in the democratic process as measured by turnouts in major elections has
declined in the United States and in several other major democratic countries.  This decline
has led to considerable interest in explaining its cause and concern about its consequences. 
With respect to the first question, a vast literature already exists that seeks to explain
differences in participation rates both within and across countries.
1  Little empirical work
exists, however, that measures the effects of lower participation on the welfare of a country. 
It is this void which we begin to fill.
Not only is there little evidence regarding the effects of low participation in politics,
there is even disagreement among observers as to what these effects should be, and whether
higher participation improves the quality of the democratic process.  John Stuart Mill (1861,
1958, p. 114), for example, opposed the broadening of the franchise on the grounds that it
would “place the principal power in the hands of classes more and more below the highest
level of instruction in the community,” and thus lead “toward collective mediocrity.”
2  Arend
Lijphart (1997, p. 1) in his presidential address to the American Political Science
Association, on the other hand, sees a greater danger from low participation in elections,
because it leads to “inequality of representation and influence [that] are not randomly
distributed but systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens – those with higher
incomes, greater wealth, and better education – and against less advantaged citizens.”  Both
Mill and Lijphart see widespread suffrage and citizen participation as having similar
consequences in terms of their effects on the composition of the active electorate, but they
                                                
     
1 The major international comparative studies would include Jackman (1987), Powell
(1980), and Verba, Nie and Kim (1978). See, also references to the earlier literature in these
works in Lijphart (1997).
     
2 See also Beer (1982).4
draw exactly opposite inferences about the desirability of greater citizen participation. 
Indeed, while Mill wished to discourage poorly educated and property-less citizens from
voting,
3 Lijphart (1997) goes so far as to advocate compelling these and all other citizens to
vote.
Mill feared that the participation of the uneducated and poor would worsen the quality
of the inputs into the political process and thereby the quality of the policies coming out of it.
 Lijphart, on the other hand, fears that low participation rates for the uneducated and poor
give rise to a class bias in the political process and thus to social injustices.  Neither
prediction excludes the other, so we must allow for the possibility that both are correct.
One way to test for the existence of class bias in the  political process is to compare
the distributions of income across countries.  If low participation by the low income and
poorly educated classes favors the rich and highly educated, we should see greater income
disparities in countries with low political participation by the lower classes.  We test this
hypothesis by relating voter participation rates to a standard measure of income inequality —
the Gini coefficient.
Mill’s concerns are more difficult to formulate as a testable hypothesis.  We make a
                                                
     
3 Mill generally favored a system of weighted voting with the votes of poorly-educated
citizens getting lower weights.  However, he advocated the outright disenfranchisement of
people who did not pay taxes, which would at that time have meant all of the poor.
It is also important that the assembly which votes the taxes, either general or
local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay something toward the
taxes imposed.  Those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other
people’s money, have every motive to be lavish and none to economize.  As
far as money matters are concerned, any power of voting possessed by them
is a violation of the fundamental principle of free government – a severance
of the power of control from the interest in its beneficial exercise.  It
amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people’s pockets for
any purpose which they think fit to call a public one;
                                                                                   John Stuart Mill (1865, p. 133)  5
first attempt to do so by estimating the effects of citizen participation on economic growth. 
We focus on this economic effect of citizen participation, because country growth rates are
widely accepted measures of economic performance.  Moreover, to achieve high levels of
growth governments must adopt intelligent economic policies, or at least refrain from foolish
ones.  Thus, if high participation by low income and uneducated classes leads to poor
government policies of one sort or another, misguided economic policies causing slow
growth are likely to be among them.  A second reason to choose economic growth to test for
the consequences of low participation is because of the popular belief in a trade-off between
efficiency and equity (Okun, 1975).  If participation in elections does affect the distribution
of income, it is likely to affect the efficiency of the economy and the rate of growth. 
Both Lijphart and Mill implicitly assume that government policies are directly
responsive to the preferences of the citizens as expressed in elections.  If the fraction of
voters with low incomes increases, government policies shift in favor of lower-income
groups.  If the fraction of uniformed or uneducated voters increases, government policies
worsen.  Where such direct links between voter preferences and government policies exist we
shall say that a country has strong democratic institutions.  
Li, Squire and Zou (1998) have recently hypothesized that in some countries, where
democratic institutions are weak, the more privileged classes are able to “capture the
government” and bend its policies to advance their interests at the expense of the larger
electorate.  The privileged classes govern both the private sector and the public sector, and
use the latter to maintain and enhance their economic status.  In these countries, government
programs are expected to be less sensitive to the composition of the electorate than in
countries with strong democratic institutions.  Li, Squire and Zou presented evidence in
support of their hypothesis using cross-national data on income inequality.  Given that we6
also try to explain cross-national differences in income inequality, we shall also allow for the
possibility that government policies are not solely determined by the composition of the
electorate in countries with weak democratic institutions.  We test this “government capture”
hypothesis by dividing our sample into countries with strong and weak democratic
institutions, and estimating separate effects of government policies for the different
subsamples.
We proceed as follows:  In Section I various hypotheses about the possible
consequences of low voter turnouts and government policies are reviewed, and the specific
models that we test are presented.  Section II describes the data, and in Section III we discuss
our findings.  Possible biases from the simultaneous nature of the model are tested for in
Section IV.  Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
I. Modeling the Economic Consequences of Voter Participation 
A. Distribution of income
The class-bias hypothesis regarding the economic consequences of low participation
rates has the following chain of logic: (1) the upper classes have higher participation rates
than the lower classes, (2) the upper classes favor right of center parties, the lower classes left
of center parties, and (3) right of center parties adopt policies that benefit the upper classes,
while left of center parties adopt policies that favor the lower classes.
Of the three, the first premise has the most empirical support.  Countless studies using
survey data within countries have found a positive correlation between participation and
various measures of economic status like education and income.
4 Although both variables are
                                                
     
4 See, for example, Powell (1980), Verba and Nie (1972), Verba, Nie and Kim (1978)
among many others.  7
usually positively related to participation rates, the impact of income sometimes disappears
once education is controlled for,
5 and Chapman and Palda (1983) even obtained a negative
and significant coefficient on income in an equation to explain voting, once education was
included.  One explanation for the strong association between education and voting is that
better educated people gather more information about government policies and candidates in
the course of their work and leisure time activities.  Thus, the costs of becoming informed
and voting are lower for better educated citizens (Filer, Kenny, and Morton, 1993).  This
explanation for the correlation between education and participation reinforces the prediction
that government policies will worsen, if high fractions of low income/low education citizens
vote, because they tend to be less-well informed about government programs.
The second premise posits that voter choices are driven by class identifications.  This
once popular view has been challenged by many.  Recent studies of the United States even
suggest that nonvoters lean toward the Republican Party (Texeira, 1992; Gant and Lyons,
1993).  Even the defenders of this hypothesis regard it as more complicated today than the
original working-class-left-of-center versus upper-class-right-of-center dichotomy implied.
6  
Premise three has found support in the many studies that have detected systematic
differences in the economic policies of parties (e.g., Hibbs, 1977, 1987; Tufte, 1978). 
Logically, however, if premise two is false, premise three should also fall, as there would be
no incentive for parties to slant their policies toward particular class interests if voter
behavior was not in part determined by these interests.  
                                                
     
5 See, Lipset (1960), Ashenfelter and Kelley (1975), and Powell (1986).  Parry, Moser and
Day (1992, Ch. 4) are one of the few studies to observe a negative relationship between
education and voting using data for Great Britain.
     
6 For discussion and references to this literature, see Fiorina (1997, pp. 391-97), Lijphart
(1997, p. 4), Evans (1999) and Grofman, Owen, and Collet (1999).8
Our goal here is not to establish the empirical support for each of the three premises,
but rather to test their joint implications with respect to the effects of voter participation.  If
the three premises are accepted, then voter participation rates across countries should be
associated with differences in the economic policies that affect the distribution of income
(Hibbs and Dennis, 1988).
7
Governments can affect the distribution of income in several ways.  Perhaps the most
obvious of these is through taxation and transfers.  In our empirical analysis, we thus include
total governmental transfers (GovTr) to explain the distribution of income in a country, as
measured by the Gini coefficient (Gini).
8  Expenditures on education, housing, health care
and the like can also affect the distribution of income.  As an alternative to government
transfers, we include total government size (GovS), which includes both expenditures and
transfers in the Gini equation. 
 The “government capture” hypothesis is tested by dividing the sample into countries
with strong and weak democratic institutions and estimating separate coefficients on the
government size and transfer variables for the different subsamples. A country is classified 
as having strong democratic institutions, if it receives the highest score (1.0) in the Freedom
House evaluation of its political rights.  All countries receiving lower scores are classified as
weak democracies.
9   If the government capture hypothesis is valid, government expenditures
                                                
     
7 Premises two and three could simply be replaced by the median voter theorem, if we
make the assumption that rich-to-poor redistribution is a single dimensional issue, as in
Meltzer and Richard (1981). The first premise – that low voter participation rates imply
disproportionately low participation by the poor – is still needed, of course.
     
8 We were not able to find another measure of income inequality with as broad a coverage
as our data for Gini coefficients exhibit.  The standard measures of income inequality tend to
be highly correlated, so we do not expect a bias from this choice.
     
9 Freedom House gives countries scores from 1 to 7 for political rights based on 8
questions that include questions like, “Are the legislative representatives elected through free9
and transfers should favor the rich in countries with weak democratic institutions.
10  
Many government policies other than expenditures and transfers can affect the
distribution of income.  Holding expenditures fixed, the distribution of income will be more
equal, the more progressive the tax system.  Government programs to encourage the hiring of
disadvantaged minorities may reduce income inequality.  In many countries governments are
directly involved in determining private sector wages.  Thus, we also include the voter
participation rate (Partic) in the equation to capture its effects of non expenditure/transfer
policies favoring the poor in the Gini equation.
Li, Squire and Zou (1998) argue that the poor fare better in countries with more
highly developed financial institutions, since these afford them better access to capital and
thus increase their chances of escaping poverty.  We retest this hypothesis using their
measure of financial development namely, M2 divided by GDP (M2).
Extreme deprivation is most prevalent in countries with rapidly growing populations
and high illiteracy (low education) levels.  To control for these factors, and better isolate the
effects of participation and government programs, we include enrollment in secondary
education (SecEd), and population growth (PopGr).
11  Adding an intercept (Inter) gives us 
Gini = Inter +β1Partic +β2M2 +  β3SecEd +  β4PopGr + β5GovTr + µ             (1)
                                                                                                                                                       
and fair elections?  Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real
power?”  “Yes” answers to these questions should make a country’s democratic institutions
strong by our definition.  Freedom House data start in 1972 for most countries. If a country is
in our data set prior to 1972 we assigned the 1972 Freedom House score to the country prior
to 1972.
     
10 The breakdown of the countries which we used is given in the appendix.
     
11 We also estimated the equation including the average GDP per capita in a country to
test whether redistribution is a form of luxury good of which richer countries consume more.
 But the variable was never statistically significant, and so we have dropped it from the
equation. 10
or 
Gini = Inter +β1Partic +β2M2 +  β3SecEd +  β4PopGr + β5GovS + µ             (2)
12
B. Government size
The logic of the class-bias hypothesis is that high voter participation rates affect
government policies, which in turn affect the distribution of income.  Thus, voter turnouts
should also be positively related to our two measures of government size, GovTr and GovS.
13
 Given the potential importance of education on the distribution of income, we shall also test
to see whether participation rates can explain governmental education expenditures (GovEd).
A variety of hypotheses about the determinants of government size have been
proposed in a vast number of studies.
14  Among the most venerable of these is “Wagner’s
Law” linking the relative size of the government sector to national income.  We test this by
including GDP per capita (GDP) in each governmental expenditure equation.
We include the fractions of the population, which are under 14 (Pop14-) and over 65
                                                
     
12 Institutional changes like the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which lowered the costs of
voting for blacks in the Southern United States, can also affect the composition of the
electorate and governmental redistribution policies.  In principal, such events could be
accounted for by adding a dummy variable.  Since our focus is not on the impacts of these
events, we have not combed the histories of every country in our sample to isolate similar
events.  This strategy has the advantage of not cluttering up our tables with a host of country
specific variables.  It has the disadvantage of lowering the explanatory power of the models.
     
13 Direct evidence in support of this part of the class bias hypothesis has recently been
presented by Husted and Kenny (1997) and Lott and Kenny (1999).  Husted and Kenny find
that the enfranchisement of low-income voters in the South following the repeal of literacy
tests and poll taxes led to an increase in transfers in the affected states.  Lott and Kenny relate
the introduction of women into the electorate to increases in state budget sizes.
     
14 For surveys of this literature see, Mueller (1989, Ch. 17), and Holsey and Borcherding
(1997).11
(Pop65+) in both the GovTr and GovS equations, since these are two major groups that are
particularly dependent on government transfers and outlays.  We exclude the Pop65+
variable from the GovEd equation.  If governments respond to demands for education and
retirement spending, then the size of these clientele groups should be related to the scale of
the governmental programs that benefit them.  If, on the other hand, governments tend to
serve the interests of the upper classes in countries with weak democratic institutions, there
may be no relationship between the scale of governmental activity, and the size of these
clientele groups.  We test this hypothesis by estimating the GovS, GovTr and GovEd
equations separately for each subsample of countries.
Cameron (1978) and Rodrik (1998) present evidence linking a country’s dependency
on international trade to the size of its government.  The hypothesis here is that in countries
with large amounts of international trade incomes are exposed to greater shocks because of
exchange rate fluctuations, large capital movements, etc.  In these countries, government
activity expands to cushion incomes from these risks.  This activity may consist of direct
transfers, targeted expenditures or, particularly in countries with poorly developed tax and
transfer systems, employment in the public sector.  We test this hypothesis by including the
ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (Open) in the government outlays equations.
The variables discussed so far may all be regarded as factors that might affect the
demand for government programs.  The size of the relative government sector can also be
expected to depend on supply factors.  Important among these is simply the government’s
capability of raising tax revenue.  Following Kau and Rubin (1982, 1999) the fraction of the
labor force that is female (Female) is included as a index of the level of economic
sophistication of a country, and thus as a proxy for its capability of raising tax revenue.
As additional variables to control for either demand or supply factors that might be12
related to the characteristics of the economy or its stage of development, we include the
fraction of the workforce engaged in agriculture (Agr), and the fraction of the population
living in urban areas (Urban).  This gives us as our basic governmental outlay models
GovS = Inter + β1GDP +  β2Pop14- +  β3Pop65+ + β4Partic + β5Open + β6Female +
β7Agr + β8Urban + µ                                                                               (3)
GovTr = Inter + β1GDP +  β2Pop14- +  β3Pop65+ + β4Partic + β5Open + β6Female +
β7Agr + β8Urban + µ                                                                               (4)
GovEd = Inter + β1GDP +  β2Pop14-  + β3Partic + β4Open + β5Female + β6Agr +
β7Urban + µ                                                                                             (5)
C. Growth
In addition to affecting the distribution of income, high participation rates may
introduce “white noise” into the democratic process.  Uneducated voters may be less capable
of evaluating the consequences of the economic policies of different parties, or make
systematic errors.  For example, lower educated voters might be more myopic, and vote for
parties that promise large transfers and reductions in unemployment, even though these
policies will result in large government deficits, inflation, and long run damage to the
economy that eventually harms the lower income classes.  We use the growth in income per
capita of a country (GDPGR) as an index of the quality of a its collective decisions, and test
to see whether it is negatively related to its voter participation rate.
Expenditures on roads and other infrastructure, and education and research outlays
can all increase a country’s growth rate.  The taxes to finance these outlays and to finance
transfers may, on the other hand, have disincentive effects which retard growth.  We test for
these effects by including both GovS and GovTr in the equation to explain GDPGR (Barro,13
1990, 1991).  Rather than measure education’s effect on growth by including government
expenditures on education, we follow other studies and include only the fraction of the
population that has completed a secondary education (SecEd).
Differences in country growth rates are directly related to their stages of economic
development.  Less-developed countries are often able to grow very rapidly by adopting the
technologies of the developed countries.  This “catch-up” hypothesis is usually tested by
regressing the growth in GDP per capita on to some initial level of income (Barro, 1991). 
We test this hypothesis by including lagged GDP (LGDP) in the equation.  As an additional
control for differences in country levels of development, we include population growth
(PopGr).  This gives us
      GDPGR = Inter + β1LGDP +  β2SecEd +  β3PopGr + β4Partic + β5GovS + µ               (6)
      GDPGR = Inter + β1LGDP +  β2SecEd +  β3PopGr + β4Partic + β5GovTr + µ              (7)
D. Participation
Although this study’s focus is not on the determinants of participation rates, but rather
on their effects, we estimate a participation equation to test whether participation is
endogenous in regressions 1 to 7.  Participation is endogenous in the regression equations if,
for example, unobserved or unmeasured variables determine both participation and, for
example, a country’s economic growth. In this case the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimates are biased and a Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimation method is required. 
Our participation equation includes the main variables used in cross-national comparison
studies. As noted above, income and education have generally been found to be positively
correlated with voter participation rates.  The logic of the Downsian voter model would
predict a negative coefficient on income per capita, however, if income captures a voter’s14
opportunity costs of time.  To measure the opportunity costs of working voters, a country’s
GDP divided by its working age population (GDP/WA) is included in the equation.  Two
measures of education attainment are employed, the fractions of the population completing
secondary (SecEd),  and primary schools (PrimEd). 
As additional instruments to help identify the effect of participation on our dependent
variables, we include several variables to capture the efficacy of a citizen’s vote, or the costs
of voting.  The bigger a country’s population, the less impact a citizen’s vote has.  We
include the population of a country  (Pop) and predict a negative coefficient for it.  Countries
with rapidly growing populations (PopGr) have relatively young populations, and are
expected therefore to have lower voter turnouts.  The fraction of the total vote captured by
the largest party ( Larg%) is included as an inverse measure of the closeness of an election,
15
and is predicted to have a negative sign.  An indicator variable which takes the value of one if
a country uses an electoral rule that allows more than one representative to be elected from
an electoral district (Multi) is included to identify countries with proportional representation
systems, and is predicted to have a positive coefficient based on previous empirical work
(Powell, 1980, 1986).  A second indicator variable which takes the value of one if a country
has a mixed electoral system that combines elements of proportional representation and
single-member-district representation (Mixed) is also included.  The costs of voting should
be lower in urbanized communities than in rural areas, because voters do not have to travel as
far to vote.  We, thus, include Urban in the participation equation and predict a positive
coefficient.  Finally, Comp is an indicator variable which takes the value of one, if a country
compels people to vote in some way (usually by imposing a small fine for not voting).  This
                                                
     
15An alternative measure for closeness of the election is the difference in the percentage
received by the top two parties.  Due to data limitations we were unable to examine whether
this measure produces significantly different results from our measure of closeness.15
gives us the following equation to explain voter participation. 
Partic = Inter + β1GDP/WA + β2SecEd +  β3PrimEd +  β4Pop + β5Popgr + β6Larg% +
β7Multi + β8Mixd + β9Urban +  β10Comp +  µ                                               (8)
II. Data Description 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and numbers of observations for the
variables used in this study. The variables are described in more detail in Table A1 of the
Appendix.  Our data set spans from 1960 to 1990 and the unit of observation is the average
value of a given variable in the five-year periods 1960-65, 1965-70, etc. period.  Table A2 in
the Appendix shows which countries are included in the data set.  The first three columns of
Table 1 contain the statistics for the full sample.  As can readily be seen, the number of
observations available  differs across the variables leading to different sized samples for
many of the models tested.
All of the countries in our sample have been classified by our data source for voter
turnouts and other electoral data (the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) as
democracies during the years in which they are in our sample.  Democracy is not a 0/1
variable, however, but comes in different strengths.  We have, therefore, divided our sample
into strong and weak democratic systems using Freedom House’s scale of the strength of a
country’s political rights (Freedom House score of 1 = strong democratic, > 1 = weak
democratic).  Under this division, the strong democratic category contains a fairly
homogeneous set of mostly high income countries like the United States, EU members,
Canada and so on.  The set of weak democratic countries is quite heterogeneous, however,
spanning the continents of Africa, Asia and North and South America.  We thus
experimented with additional subdivisions of the weak democratic subsample and found, as16
we shall see, sometimes rather dramatic differences between the weak-democratic Latin
American countries and rest of the subsample.  The Latin American countries have many
common features, which make this a reasonable grouping, e.g., they are Catholic countries
with populations consisting of a mixture of people of European and  native ancestry, the
Europeans come predominantly from the Iberian peninsula, and they mostly employ
presidential systems of government.  Although the remaining group of weak-democratic
countries remains somewhat heterogeneous, further subdivision of the sample (e.g.,
Africa/Asia) was precluded by the small number of observations available for each group. 
The last nine columns in Table 1 present the summary statistics for each of the three
subsamples.
Many countries hold separate elections for their legislative assemblies and presidents.
 Since government policies must always be approved by the legislature, but not necessarily
by the president in every country, we believe that the most relevant turnout figures are for
elections to the legislatures and have used these figures.  This choice implies for the United
States, that figures for turnouts in Congressional elections in years when the president is not
elected are used.
The average participation rate across the full sample was nearly 68 percent of the
voting age population.  The mean in the strong-democratic countries (hereafter, SD
countries) was 77 percent, which was much higher than the 65 percent observed in the weak-
democratic, non Latin American countries (hereafter, WDNLA countries), and the 59 percent
in the weak-democratic, Latin American countries (hereafter, WDLA countries). 
Compulsory voting is most popular among the  WDLA countries with 71 percent of them
having it, and least popular in the WDNLA countries (10 percent).  As noted above, the
strong-democratic countries have much higher incomes than the weak-democratic countries. 17
GDP per capita is $8,733 in the SD countries, $2,881 in the WDNLA countries, and $2,764
in the WDLA countries.
The weak-democratic Latin American countries have the most unequal distributions
of income (mean Gini = 48.7), followed by the WDNLA countries (mean Gini = 40.2), with
the SD countries having the most evenly distributed incomes (mean Gini = 35.4).
16
The WDNLA countries had the fastest growth on average (3.1 percent), while the
WDLA countries had the slowest growth with a mean of only 1.3 percent.  On average the
government sector accounted for 21 percent of GDP in the Latin and Central American
countries, 29 percent of GDP in the WDNLA countries and 39 percent in the SD countries. 
                                                
     
16 In this study we use the after-tax Gini coefficient.18
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of All Variables
Full Sample Strong Democracy Weak Democracy/ Non Latin
America
Weak Democracy/Latin America
Variable Mean S.D. n Mean  S.D. n Mean  S.D. n Mean  S.D.  n
Gini 40.24 9.37 247 35.36 7.20 106 40.20 8.99 79 48.65 6.90 62
GDPPR 0.023 0.027 312 .025 0.019 131 0.032 0.031 92 0.013 0.030 89
Partic 0.679 0.176 342 0.774 0.125 133 0.649 0.164 111 0.586 0.188 98
GovTr 0.095 0.073 217 0.158 0.060 90 0.056 0.046 74 0.046 0.039 53
GovS 0.312 0.134 399 0.387 0.114 127 0.290 0.124 97 0.213 0.101 75
GovEd 0.033 0.018 222 0.034 0.020 91 0.036 0.017 78 0.027 0.015 53
GDP 5212 3915 329 8733 3369 133 2881 2390 99 2764 1538 97
SecEd 20.63 16.13 342 31.68 17.18 133 14.83 13.12 111 12.19 6.33 98
PrimEd 49.26 19.87 341 55.18 20.35 133 38.53 19.55 110 53.28 14.03 98
Larg % 0.485 0.160 304 0.427 0.103 133 0.501 0.174 75 0.553 0.184 96
Pop 34,353 90,320 304 26,888 46,425 133 71,842 163,235 75 15,407 26,790 96
PopGr 0.018 0.011 336 0.010 0.009 131 0.022 0.010 110 0.025 0.009 95
Comp 0.357 0.480 342 0.308 0.464 133 0.099 0.300 111 0.714 0.454 98
Multi 0.720 0.450 304 0.684 0.467 133 0.600 0.493 75 0.865 0.344 96
Mixed 0.056 0.230 304 0.015 0.122 131 0.120 0.327 75 0.063 0.243 9619
LGDP 4,673 3,608 312 7,794 3,170 131 2,308 1,985 92 2,525 1,442 89
Open 0.687 0.533 242 0.661 0.343 101 0.851 0.761 83 0.497 0.287 58
Female 30.86  8.72 299 34.39 6.75 127 33.00 8.21 97 22.12 6.00 75
Urban 57.60 23.29 299 71.31 16.41 127 42.89 25.86 97 53.41 15.32 75
Pop65+ 0.071 0.043 340 0.113 0.033 133 0.050 0.029 111 0.041 0.018 98
Pop14- 0.338 0.098 340 0.254 0.069 133 0.368 0.081 111 0.415 0.057 98
M2/GDP 38.59 24.32 313  53.17 25.07 115 37.90 22.60 103 21.68 9.83 9520
III. The Results
A. Income Distribution
Table 2 presents the results for five income distribution regressions, which test the
class bias and government capture hypotheses.  We have sought to include as many countries
and observations in each regression as we could.  This strategy causes the number of
observations to vary across the models depending on which variables are included, and thus
which countries had to be dropped because of missing observations.
The results with respect to the voter participation variable offer strong support for the
class bias hypothesis.  In all five specifications of the model, Partic has a negative and
significant coefficient.  Moreover, the sizes of its coefficients imply a potentially large
reduction in income inequality from an increase in voter participation. An increase in the
participation rate from 40 percent to 80 percent, values towards the ends of the range of voter
participation rates, is estimated to reduce the Gini coefficient by around 4.0, about 10 percent
of its mean value for the full sample of countries.
17
For the full sample, the coefficients on both total governmental outlays (eq. 2) and
governmental transfers (eq. 3) have the predicted negative signs, but neither is statistically
significant.  The impact of government size and government transfers on the Gini coefficient
differs dramatically across the three subsets of countries, however.  Although the coefficient
on GovS remains negative and statistically insignificant for both the SD and WDNLA
countries, it becomes positive and highly significant for the WDLA countries (eq. 4).  This
result supports the prediction that government serves the interests of the upper classes in
                                                
     
17 We also estimated separate regressions including either GovS or GovTr for each of the
three subsamples.  All coefficients on Partic fell in the range of -8 to -12 and were highly
significant.  Since no additional insights were gained from the six regressions over what is
implied by eqs. 4 and 5 of Table 2, we have chosen the simpler presentation of the results.21
countries with weak democratic institutions, at least in Latin and Central America.  
The difference across the three samples of countries is even more dramatic for
government transfers (eq. 5). Government transfers in both the SD and the WDNLA countries
have negative coefficients that are significant at the 10 and 5 percent levels respectively.    An
increase in government transfers by five percent of GDP in the SD countries is predicted to
reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.85 of a point.  The same increase in the WDNLA countries
—  which would amount to a doubling of the mean value of transfers for these countries —
reduces income inequality by twice as much. 
The coefficient on GovTr for the WDLA countries is, on the other hand, positive,
large in absolute value, and significant at the one percent level.  An increase of government
transfers by five percent of GDP, i.e., a doubling of the mean value of transfers for these
countries, would increase the Gini coefficient by some 3 points, 7.5 percent of its mean in the
WDLA countries.  Thus, government’s impact on income inequality is seen to be quite
different across the three groups of countries.
The measure of financial development (M2/GDP) has the predicted negative sign and
is significant in all five specifications.  All coefficients on SecEd and PopGr also have the
predicted signs, with nine of the ten being statistically significant.  Countries with higher
levels of financial development and secondary education have lower Gini coefficients, while




OLS Regression Results Explaining Differences in Income Distribution Across
Countries
                                                
     
18The results for the Gini equations are robust to including female labor participation, the
country’s age distribution, and urbanization.22
Dependent Variable is Gini Coefficient













































































n 225 199 147 199 147
.415 0.461 0.550 0.521 0.632
The results reported in Table 2 offer support for both the class bias and government
capture hypothesis.  The participation variable has a negative and statistically significant23
coefficient in all five specifications of the model indicating that non expenditure policies
favoring the poor seem to be helped by higher voter turnouts in all countries.  Further support
for the class bias hypothesis is found in countries with strong democratic institutions and in
the non Latin American countries with weak democratic institutions, where government
transfer programs have a significant negative impact on income inequality.  In the WDLA
countries, on the other hand, government transfers appear to go to the higher income groups




Table 3 shows the effect of participation on various categories of government
spending. Because the results differ in several respects across the three subsamples, we
                                                
     
19An alternative estimation technique to the one presented here is to include country
indicators in each regression equation. This method effectively estimates the effect of
changes in participation on changes in the dependent variable. We chose not to employ this
estimation technique for several reasons. Given data limitations, often countries occur in our
data set only a few times. For example, depending on the specification, we have on average
200 observations and about 65 countries for the entire sample.  Given that we lose one
observation per country when we examine changes in variables, we would have effectively
only two observations per country and thus would lose many degrees of freedom, if we
included country indicators. Moreover, some countries have data gaps in their time series, so
we would have to drop these countries because time periods are not adjoining, exacerbating
the reduction in the degrees of freedom that is associated with the inclusion of country
indicators. Lastly, changes in participation rates within a country occur slowly over time and
thus we believe that given the current data limitations, our analysis of differences in rates
across countries rather than changes within a country is the more promising way to proceed.24
present separate regressions for each.
The voter participation rate has a positive coefficient in 11 of the 12 government
outlays equations, and is statistically significant in eight of them.  The voter turnout
coefficient is statistically significant in all three government outlays equations across the full
sample, and for the three equations estimated over the SD countries. The latter result adds
further support for the class bias hypothesis in these countries.  In Table 2 we saw that
government size (weakly) and government transfers (significantly) reduce income inequality
in the SD countries. Equations 4 and 5 of Table 3 indicate that higher participation rates lead
to higher government spending and transfers in these countries.  Thus, higher voter
participation in the SD countries appears to reduce income inequality by affecting both
governmental outlays and non expenditure programs in these countries.  Since education
levels also have a significant negative effect on the size of the Gini coefficient (Table 2), and
voter participation has a significant positive impact on government spending on education in
the SD countries (eq. 6), this combination of results also supports the class bias hypothesis
for the SD countries.
In contrast to the SD countries, only two of the coefficients on Partic are significant in
the six equations for the weak-democratic countries.  In both cases this occurs for the
government size equation.  The fact that higher participation rates do not lead to significantly
higher transfers and expenditures on education in countries with weak democratic institutions
supports the capture hypothesis.  Greater participation by the poor in the political process
does not lead to expansions of those governmental programs that can potentially affect them
the most in countries with weak democratic institutions.  
The hypothesis that the upper classes can capture the government in countries with
weak-democratic institutions receives further support for the Central and Latin American25
countries, when we examine the coefficients on the fractions of the population 65 and older
and 14 and under.  The level of government transfers in WDLA countries is unrelated to the26
Table 3
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fraction of the population over 65, and total government expenditures are significantly
negatively related to this variable.  This result is consistent with that observed in eq. 5 of
Table 2, where government transfers had a positive impact on the Gini coefficient, and thus
seemed targeted toward the rich.  Eq. 11 of Table 3 tells us government transfers in the
WDLA countries are not targeted to two major low-income groups, children and the elderly.
Spending on education is positively related to the fraction of the population under 14 in the
Central and Latin American countries, however. 
Among the control variables, the openness of a country to trade has the most
consistent and strongest relationship to government size.  Its coefficient is positive in all 12
government outlays equations in Table 3, and significant in 11 of them.  Thus, the hypothesis
that exposure to international risk leads to an expansion of the government sector receives
considerable support in our data. The only other control variable that performs consistently
across the different samples is the fraction of a country’s population engaged in agriculture. 
Its coefficient is negative in all 12 equations in Table 3, and significant in four of them. 
20
C. Growth
Table 4 presents the results for the growth regressions. As was true for the Gini
coefficient equations, the main differences across the three subsamples occur with respect to
the GovS and GovTr variables, so we have only estimated separate coefficients for these, 
while constraining the coefficients on all other variables to be the same across the full
                                                
     
20 We also tried including the fraction of the population working in the service sector as
another proxy for a country’s state of development and thus ability to raise tax revenue, but it
performed more poorly than the other control variables and thus was dropped.29
sample.30
Table 4
OLS Regression Results Explaining the Growth in Income per Capita Across Countries







































































n 272 192 272 192
0.117 0.074 0.206 0.170
The relationship between government size and growth is negative and significant for
the full sample, and for each of the three subsamples.  Moreover, GovS’s coefficients are31
quite large. In the full sample an increase in the size of government by 20 percent of GDP
shaves nearly a full point off a country’s growth rate.  For the Latin and Central American
subsample, each increase in government size of ten percent of GDP is predicted to reduce a
country’s growth rate by a full percentage point. These findings are inconsistent with the
hypothesis of a positive association between government size and growth in low-income
countries, where the government sectors tend to be small, and a negative relationship in the
high-income countries, where government sectors have perhaps grown too large (Karras,
1996).  Our results show that the impact of increases in government size is negative in both
the SD countries,  which generally have high incomes, and in countries with weak-
democratic institutions, which generally have low incomes.
21
While government size has a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the
full sample and all three subsamples in our growth regressions, government transfers are
significantly related to economic growth only with respect to the WDLA countries, although
the other three coefficients are of the correct sign.  Government transfers average about 40
percent of total government outlays in the SD countries, and about 25  percent in the other
two samples.  Their lack of significance in explaining growth relative to total government
spending suggests that it is the disincentive effects of high tax rates, government crowding
out of private investment and so on, and not characteristics of the transfer programs per se
that slows growth in the SD and WDNLA countries.  Once again, the interpretation is
somewhat different for the WDLA countries.  The coefficient on transfers for these countries
is almost three times larger than for GovS.  Where an increase in total government size of ten
percent of GDP is predicted to reduce a Latin American country’s growth rate by one
                                                
     
21 We tested directly for a nonlinear relationship between government size and growth by
including quadratic terms in each regression, but they did not improve the fit to the data, nor
change the interpretation of government size’s impact on growth.32
percentage point, the same increase in transfers reduces the growth rate by three percentage
points.  Since growth averages only 1.2 percent in the Latin/Central American countries, the
negative impact of transfer programs on growth is quite substantial. When one takes into
account that transfers in these countries also increase income inequality, their overall impact
must be judged to be quite negative.
The voter participation variable is statistically insignificant in all four equations. 
Thus, any non expenditure programs that are brought about because of higher voter turnouts
do not appear to impact economic growth adversely.  The only adverse effect of voter
participation on growth comes through participation’s positive effect on government size,
and government size’s negative effect on growth.
Most of the other results are consistent with the previous findings in the cross-country
growth literature. The catch-up hypothesis finds support in the statistically significant
negative coefficients on lagged GDP per capita in all four equations. Population growth has a
consistent negative relationship with growth, and secondary education’s effect is weakly
positive. 
D. Participation
Table 5 reports results for the voter participation equation. As was the case for the
government outlays, there are several differences in the estimates across the different
subsamples, and so we present separate estimates for each.  Our main purpose in estimating
these equations is not to test different hypotheses about voter participation using cross-33
national data, but to specify an equation, which we can use to instrument participation in our
other equations to determine whether our results are sensitive to the possible endogeneity of
this variable. 
The best fit to the data and the closest match to our predictions occur for countries
with strong-democratic institutions.  All coefficients are statistically significant except for the
education variables and the dummy variable for mixed electoral systems, and even these have
the predicted positive coefficients.  That the best fit to the data comes for the SD countries is
reassuring, since our choice of variables and predictions are largely based on the assumption
that the democratic process responds to the demands of  the voters, and that the voters are
rational actors.  Where democratic institutions are weak, and government policies are less
closely related to voter preferences, the act of voting is more random.
GDP/WA has a negative and significant coefficient for the SD countries subsample. 
This result is rather strong support for the rational actor model of voting, if one assumes that
voters in high income countries generally have higher opportunity costs of voting.
22, 
23  
                                                
     
22This finding does not necessarily undermine the basic premise underlying the class-bias
hypothesis.  It is perfectly possible that income and voter participation rates are positively
correlated within countries, as countless survey studies have established, and negatively
correlated across countries.
     
23 We used GDP per working age person (GDP/WA) in this equation, but the results are
very similar if we use GDP per capita.34
Table 5
OLS Regression Results Explaining Differences in Voter Participation in National Elections Across Countries
Dependent Variable is Voter Turnout as a Fraction of the Voting Age Population

















































































































t-statistics are below the estimated coefficients.35
The negative and significant coefficient on population size for the SD countries can be
interpreted as support for the Downsian voter model, under the assumption that the efficacy
of one’s vote declines with population size.  Rapid population growth leads to younger
populations and, since the young vote with lower frequencies, to lower turnouts.  Countries
which elect more than one candidate from each electoral district are found to have higher
turnouts as in other studies, a result generally attributed to the stronger ties between voters
and parties and thus lower voter alienation than characterizes multiparty systems.  The
coefficient on the dummy variable for mixed systems is positive as expected, but statistically
insignificant. 
Compulsory voting has a positive and significant coefficient.  Raising the cost of not
voting increases voter turnouts.  The predicted increase in the participation rate is rather
small, however, 3.8 percent.  High urbanization is expected to reduce the cost of voting and
increase turnouts, and this prediction is confirmed by the positive coefficient on Urban.
The results for the other two subsamples and a fortiori for the full sample are weaker
statistically and less consistent with our predictions, and we shall not devote considerable
space to try and account for these anomalies.  Starting with Larg%, we see that it has a
positive and statistically insignificant coefficient in the WDLA countries sample, but has a
negative and significant coefficient in the WDNLA countries, where dominant-party states
are relatively common.  Compulsory voting has a positive and significant impact on turnouts
in the WDLA countries, where it is frequently used, an insignificant coefficient in the
WDNLA countries, where it is seldom used.  Introducing compulsory voting in a Latin
American country increases the predicted turnout by nine percentage points.  Multiparty
systems are positively related to participation rates in both weak-democratic subsamples, but
significantly so only for the WDLA countries.36
IV. Simultaneous Equations Issues 
We have developed several equations to test the different hypotheses regarding the
consequences of low voter  participation in elections.  However, our OLS results may suffer
from biases, if participation rates are endogenous in the regression equations. The standard
test for such endogeneity is the Wu-Hausman test (Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978).  It examines
whether the 2SLS estimates are sufficiently different from the OLS estimates to warrant
estimating a simultaneous equations model. If participation is not endogenous, OLS results in
more efficient parameter estimates and thus is preferable. To implement this test we estimate
a 2SLS regression, with the electoral rule variables, closeness of the election, and population
size as instruments. 2SLS estimation will result in consistent estimates, if at least one of the
instruments is correlated with participation but not with inequality, growth, or the size of
government. We perform the Wu-Hausman test for each equation in Tables 2, 3, and 4. The
null hypothesis of this test is that participation is exogenous and that therefore OLS is the
correct estimation procedure. 
The results of these tests are summarized in Table 6.
24  The first 3 columns pertain to
the results in Table 2, where the Gini coefficient is the dependent variable.  The null
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level for all five equations.
                                                
     
24We report only the estimates for the participation variable, because the coefficients and
standard errors for the remaining variables remained similar to those in the previously
reported OLS results.37
Table 6
Wu-Hausman Tests and Two Stage Least Squares Estimates

























1 -0.79 1 1.61 1 0.01
2 -1.19 2 -0.09 2 1.29




4 0.21 4 1.28 4 0.62









The cells for the 2SLS coefficient is left blank when the Wu-Hausman test statistic does not allow the
rejection of the null hypothesis that participation is endogenous.
In two of the 12 equations from Table 3, the null hypothesis of no endogeneity had to
be rejected.  In both cases (eqs. 3, and 12) education expenditures were the dependent
variables.  For the full sample, the coefficient on participation remained positive and
increased in absolute size.  In the Latin American subsample, however, the coefficient on
participation changes from insignificantly negative to significantly positive.  Thus, combining38
the OLS results from Table 3 for eqs. 10 and 11 with the 2SLS estimates for eq. 12 we find
that higher voter participation rates in WDLA countries countries significantly increase both
total government expenditures and expenditures on education.
The null hypothesis was  rejected in one of the four equations of Table 4.  Re-
estimating equation 3 of Table 4 using 2SLS produced a positive and significant coefficient
on participation.  This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that high voter participation
rates lower the quality of the outcomes of the political process, at least in so far as this quality
is measured by economic growth.  Once account is taken of the possible endogeneity of voter
turnouts, higher turnouts are associated with higher rates of growth.
VI. Conclusions
Of the three hypotheses tested in this paper, the class bias hypothesis receives the
most support.  Citizen participation has a direct negative impact on income inequality in our
full sample and across the three subsamples.  Citizen participation also has an indirect effect
on income inequality through its effect on government size or transfers in each of the three
subsamples.  In the subsamples of strong democratic and weak democratic non Latin
American countries, this indirect impact is negative.  Participation increases government size
and/or transfers, and these in turn further  reduce income inequality.  In the weak democratic,
Latin American countries, however, the indirect impact is positive.  Participation increases
government size and (weakly) government transfers, but both of these lead to greater income
inequality.  This result is consistent with the government capture hypothesis in the weak
democratic, Latin American countries.  In these countries, the upper income classes appear to
influence government policies to benefit themselves.  The government capture hypothesis
found further support in the Latin American subsample in the lack of a relationship between39
both total government expenditures and government transfers and the sizes of the main
clientele groups in these countries – the aged and the young.
On the other hand, we did not find support the government capture hypothesis in the
weak democratic, non Latin American countries.  In these countries as in the countries with
strong democratic institutions, government transfers significantly reduced income inequality.
Weak democratic institutions are clearly not a sufficient condition for government capture by
the upper class elites.
The third hypothesis, which we tested, received little support.  In the OLS regressions
voter participation had no impact on economic growth, and in one 2SLS regression it had a
positive impact.  This regression implied that increasing participation by the poor and
uneducated actually improved the outcomes of the political process as measured by economic
growth.
All of the consequences of higher voter participation rates are not so benign, however.
 An indirect, negative effect of participation on income growth exists, because high voter
participation increases the size of the government sector, and greater government size or
transfers reduce the growth of GDP.  This negative effect of government size on economic
growth was observed across the full sample of countries and in each of the three country
subsamples.
We conclude that the degree of voter participation in elections is an important
determinant of a country’s economic policies.  For those who favor greater income equality,
high participation rates can be said to have beneficial effects.  For those who are concerned
about the increase in the size of the government sector over the last forty years, however, 
greater voter participation rates can be seen to have some costs.  An additional finding of our
study that warrants further research is that where democratic institutions are weak, the40
outcomes of government policies may not be solely determined by the preferences of the
voting electorate.  Within Latin and Central American countries with weak democratic
institutions, the upper income classes appear to exert a disproportionate impact on
government policies.41
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Table 1A 
Variable
Name  Variable Source Variable Description
Gini Deininger and Squire, 1996 Gini coefficient
Partic IDEA, 1998 turnout as percent of voting age population
GovEd Barro and Lee, 1994 government expenditure on education as percent of GDP
Pop14 World Bank percent of population under 15 years
Pop65+ World Bank percent of population above 64 years
Open World Bank, 1995 Exports and Imports as percent of GDP
Female World Bank, 1995 percent female in labor force
Agr World Bank, 1995 value added in agriculture as percent of GDP
Serv World Bank, 1995 value added in services as percent of GDP
Urban World Bank, 1995 percent of population living in urban areas
GDPGR Barro and Lee, 1994 growth rate of GDP
GovS World Bank, 1995 and United
Nations, 1977
government size as percent of GDP
PopGr Barro and Lee, 1994 population growth
GovTr World Bank, 1995 government transfers as percent of GDP
GDP Barro and Lee, 1994 GDP
SecEd Barro and Lee, 1994 percent of population with primary education
PrimEd Barro and Lee, 1994 percent of population with primary education
Pop Penn World Tables, Mark
5.6a
population size
Popgr Penn World Tables, Mark
5.6a
population growth rate
Larg% IDEA, 1998 percentage vote share of largest party in parliamentary
elections, or vote share of first placed candidate in
presidential elections
Comp IDEA, 1998 indicator for compulsory voting law
Multi IDEA, 1998 electoral rule that allows more than one representative to
be elected from an electoral district
                  Mixed IDEA, 1998 indicator for electoral rule that is a mixture of a multi- and
                     single-representative per district electoral
rule
                       FH                        Freedom House
   
                                                 measure of political rights
  Table 2A 
Countries and Number of Elections
Country N Classification Country N Classification
Argentina 15 WDLA Jordan 6 WDNLA
Australia 17 SD Korea 13 WDNAL
Austria 7 SD Lesotho 13 WDNAL
Bangladesh 12 WDNLA Malaysia 10 WDNAL
Barbados 10 WDNLA Malta 6 SD/WDNAL
Belgium 10 SD Mauritius 7 WDNLA
Bolivia 7 WDLA Mexico 8 WDLA
Botswana 10 WDNLA Nepal 5 WDNLA
Brazil 10 WDLA Netherlands 8 SD
Cameroon 6 WDNLA New Zealand 4 SD
Canada 9 SD Nicaragua 8 WDLA
Chile 11 WDLA Norway 9 SD
Columbia 7 WDLA Pakistan 13 WDNLA
Costa Rica 3 SD Panama 8 WDLA
Cyprus 9 WDNLA Papua New
Gunea
11 WDNLA
Denmark 19 SD Paraguay 8 WDLA
Dominican Republic 4 WDNLA Peru 10 WDLA
Ecuador 7 WDLA Philippines 8 WDNLA
El Salvador 6 WSLA Poland 12 WDNLA
Finland 7 SD, WDNLA Portugal 17 SD/WDNLA
France 12 SD Senegal 7 WDNLA
Gambia 11 WDNLA Sierra Leone 11 WDNLA
Germany 4 SD Singapore 8 WDNLA
Ghana 14 WDNLA Spain 3 SD/WDNLA
Greece 16 SD, SDNLA Sri Lanka 9 WDNLA
Guatemala 15 WDLA Sweden 6 SD
Guyana 14 WDLA Switzerland 6 SD
Haiti 4 WDLA Thailand 8 WDNLA
Honduras 11 WDLA Togo 7 WDNLA
Hungary 3 WDNLA Trinidad +
Tobago
4 SD/WDLA
Iceland 14 SD Tunisia 7 WDNLA
India 12 WDNLA Turkey 7 WDNLA
Indonesia 10 WDNLA United Kingdom 6 SD
Ireland 9 SD Uruguay 7 WDLA
Israel 14 WDNLA USA 9 SD
Italy 9 SD Venezuela 12 SD/WDNLA
Jamaica 3 SD/WDNLA Zambia 9 WDNLA
Japan 4 SD/WDNLA Zimbabwe 6 WDNLA
When more than one category is listed for a given country, the country was in one of the
categories for some time periods and the other category in other time periods.